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I. THE PRESENT SITUATION
Traditional tort liability for personal injury from auto acci-
dents has long been criticized on the grounds that the costs are too
high and that any compensation therefrom is inefficient, unfair,
and dilatory.2  But no-fault laws3 themselves are criticized for in-
1. This article is excerpted, updated, and adapted for precise application to
the state of Minnesota from three articles, of more general national application, by
the same authors (with the addition here of Alexander Karan). See Jeffrey
O'Connell et al., Consumer Choice in the Auto Insurance Market, 52 MD. L. REv. 1016
(1993) [hereinafter Maryland One]; Jeffrey O'Connell et al., The Costs of Consumer
Choice for Auto Insurance in States Without No-Fault Insurance, 54 MD. L. REV. 281
(1995) (written by the authors of Maryland One and Daniel Kaiser) [hereinafter
Maryland Two]; Jeffrey O'Connell et al., The Comparative Costs of Allowing Consumer
Choice for Auto Insurance in All Fifty States, 55 MD. L. REv. 160 (1996) (written by the
authors of Maryland One and Paul Jamieson) [hereinafter Maryland Three]; see also
ROBERT H. JOOST, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAw § 6:26 (2d ed. 1992)
(explaining the status of auto insurance in Minnesota).
* The Samuel H. McCoy, II Professor of Law, University of Virginia; B.A.,
1951, Dartmouth College;J.D., 1954, Harvard University.
** Senior Economist, RAND; B.S., 1962, M.S., 1964, Illinois Institute of
Technology; Ph.D., 1968,Johns Hopkins University.
t Senior Fellow and Director, Project for Civil Justice Reform, Hudson In-
stitute; B.A., 1960, City University of New York; J.D., 1964, Yale University.
tt Mathematician, RAND; B.S., 1961, Ph.D., 1967, University of Michigan.
ttt A.B., University of Chicago; M.A., University of Northern Iowa.
2. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL & JAMES S. KAKAIK, NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE vii (1991); JEFFERY O'CONNELL & C. BRIAN KELLY,
THE BLAME GAME: INJURIES, INSURANCE, AND INJUSTICE 114-15 (1987). For other
recent data supporting the various criticisms of traditional tort liability, see gener-
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fringing upon the fundamental legal right to be paid not only eco-
nomic but also noneconomic damages (primarily for pain and suf-
ferini), and for failing in their promise to suppress auto insurance
costs. No-fault proponents counter with the argument that any fi-
nancial shortcomings of the laws are due to the plaintiffs contin-
ued ability to press traditional tort claims. These additional claims
are in compensation for injuries that exceed either dollar loss or
physical (verbally described) severity thresholds.'
This article addresses the question of whether there is a com-
pensation scheme that can free Minnesota insureds from the fail-
ures of traditional tort law and at the same time mend the short-
comings of current no-fault laws. In 1991, the RAND Corporation,
which takes a neutral position in the debate about auto compensa-
tion plans, published a comparative study of the two schemes.6
RAND examined the following personal injury protection (PIP)7
issues:
(1) The effect of PIP reform on: (a) the costs of compensa-
tion; (b) transaction costs (mainly lawyers' fees and allied
costs of processing claims); (c) "the adequacy and equity"
of compensation; and (d) promptitude of compensation;8
(2) the effect of variations in the design of PIP reforms on
items (a)-(d) above;9 and
(3) the variations of PIP among states.10
The RAND study came to the following conclusions:
(1) A PIP system can produce either substantial savings com-
ally INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTO INJURIES: CLAIMING BEHAVIOR AND ITS
IMPACT ON INS. COSTS (1994) [hereinafter CLAIMING BEHAVIOR]. For the terms of a
bipartisan federal auto choice bill, see S. 625, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
3. A no-fault law mandates the purchase of auto insurance payable by one's
own insurer for economic loss without reference to fault, but also precludes acci-
dent victims from recovering noneconomic damages in tort unless they can prove
another person was at fault and that their losses exceed a threshold defined by the
no-fault law.
4. See CARROLL & KAKALIK, supra note 2, at vii; O'CONNELL & KELLY, supra
note 2, at 118.
5. See O'CONNELL & KELLY, supra note 2, at 120.
6. See generally CARROLL & KAKALIK, supra note 2 (focusing on possible conse-
quences of a state's adoption of a no-fault scheme).
7. Insurance that is payable for economic loss without regard to fault is
termed "personal injury protection" (PIP) insurance. See Maryland One, supra note
1, at 1017 n.7.
8. See CARROLL & KAKALIK, supra note 2, at 4.
9. See id. at xi.
10. See id. at xv.
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pared to the fault-based system or, depending on the
plan's design and variables in different states that affect
auto insurance costs, it can increase those costs. Such
variables include the size of PIP benefits, the nature and
extent of any barrier to tort claims for noneconomic
damages, the litigiousness of the state's populace, and so
11
on;
(2) PIP plans decrease transaction costs;
12
(3) compensation under PIP reforms is more closely aligned
with economic losses (mainly expenses for medical costs
and wage loss) than tort law;1
3
(4) present PIP reforms eliminate compensation for non-
economic losses (mainly for pain and suffering) but only
in cases of less serious injuries;
4
(5) compensation is paid more promptly from PIP coverage;"
and
(6) in choosing between traditional tort law and PIP reforms,
policymakers must determine "whether to cut costs or to
preserve or increase compensation for injured people,
and what balance to seek between compensation for eco-
nomic and for noneconomic losses."
16
A good measure of an underlying cause for the rise in auto in-
surance premiums is the change in recent years in the ratio of bod-
ily injury (BI) to property damage (PD) claims, i.e., the BI-PD ra-
tio." The higher ratio indicates a greater proportion of insureds
claiming bodily injury. Nationally, that ratio has steadily risen. In
Minnesota, it rose from 5.8 BI claims per 100 PD claims in 1980 to
12.1 per 100 by 1995.18 It might be noted that the BI-PD ratio is
27% higher in Minneapolis than in the rest of the state, reflecting
more aggressive claim practices in urban areas. 19 These recent in-
11. See id. at 43.
12. See id. at 21.
13. See id. at 23.
14. See id. at 21-22.
15. See id. at 26.
16. See Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1018.
17. See id. at 1021-24.
18. See INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO BODILY INJURY CLAIMS,
app. A, tbl. A-25 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter TRENDS].
19. SeeJorNT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, AUTO
CHOICE: IMPACT ON CITIES AND THE POOR 9, tbl. 2 (1998). The JEC report is truly a
stunning compendium of numerous counterproductive aspects of the tort system
as applied to auto accidents especially not limited to urban areas and the poor. See
3
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creases in frequency of personal injury claims are all the more
dramatic for having occurred while many correlative indices have
decreased. Technological advances and public policy initiatives
have decreased both the frequency and severity of automobile ac-
cidents. 20 Examples include: (1) safer cars containing collapsible
steering wheels, padded dashboards, energy-absorbing fronts, and
airbags; (2) massive education and law enforcement campaigns
against drunk driving; (3) increased urbanization, with resultant
lower rates of speed which diminish accident severity; and (4) use
of seat belts and child-restraint devices. According to a study by the
Insurance Research Council, most of the additional automobile
personal injury claims made in the United States during the period
1987 to 1992 were for soft-tissue injuries (e.g., sprains and strains to
the neck and back) ,l which, not coincidentally, are difficult to ob-
jectively diagnose. During the same period there was a manifest
drop in the number of automobile injuries that could be objectively
diagnosed (e.g., broken bones), as well as a drop in hospital admis-
sions and disabilities caused by automobile accidents. Such de-
creases make a dramatic contemporaneous increase in bodily injury
claims all the more anomalous. Once again the problems are more
acute in urban areas. The frequency of BI claims in Minneapolis is
63% higher than in the rest of the state, with average loss costs 53%
higher though the severity of accidents is 3% lower. 
3
How to explain the anomaly? Obviously, the key is the increas-
ing tendency of claimants (encouraged by their lawyers) to inflate
their claims to exceed the threshold above which claimants can
"double d2," by being paid both by PIP benefits and tort liability
insurance. Thus the often-suggested reform is to strengthen the
id. passim.
20. See BuREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 609 (112th ed. 1992) [hereinafter 1992
STATISTICAL ABSTRACr]; Daniel Popes, The Fraud Tax: The Cost of Hidden Corruption
in America's Tax Law, Legal Backgrounder (Wash. Legal Found., Wash., D.C.),
Mar. 27, 1992, at 1.
21. See CLAIMING BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at 21.
22. See id. at Fig. 3-9.
23. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
24. The following is comparative information on Minnesota and other na-
tional data compiled by the Insurance Research Council.
A. Four major trends
1. More people involved in auto accidents are making claims for in-
juries, even though accidental injury rates are declining because of
a) increased seat belt use
b) increased use of air bags
[Vol. 24
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c) tougher DWI laws
2. Additional claims for relatively minor injuries
3. Medical expenses climbing rapidly
4. People more likely to hire attorney for help
B. PIP Claims-1980-1995
1. Countrywide
a) Claim frequency-up 1.1%
b) Claim severity-up 157%
c) Average loss cost-up 160%
2. Minnesota
a) Claim frequency-up 46.7%
b) Claim severity-up 109.5%
c) Average loss cost-up 208.4%
C. BI Claims-1980-1995
1. Countrywide
a) Claim frequency-up 38.6%
b) Claim severity-up 100.1%
c) Average loss cost-up 176.7%
2. Minnesota
a) Claim frequency-up 80.8%
b) Claim severity-up 32.2%
c) Average loss cost-up 147.6%
D. P.D. Trends-1980-1995, Countrywide and Minnesota similar-
downward
1. Countrywide-down 16.2% (frequency)
2. Minnesota--down 13.2% (frequency)
E. Number of BI Claims per 100 P.D. Claims (i.e., measures likelihood of
injury claim being paid given an accident serious enough to cause some
danger); 1980-1995
1. Countrywide
a) Increased 64.8% (17.9 to 29.5)
2. Minnesota
a) Increased 109.4% (5.8 to 12.1)
F. Insurance Research Council additional data based on 1987-1994 sup-
ports trends
1. Average injury loss (BI, PIP, UM, UIM)
a) Countrywide-up 52.1% (6.2% per year)
b) Minnesota-up 83.2% (9.0% per year)
2. Average property damage loss
a) Countrywide-up 26.9% (3.5% per year)
b) Minnesota-up 54.7% (6.4% per year)
3. Injury to property damage cost index
a) Countrywide-up 19.8% (2.6% per year)
b) Minnesota-up 18.5% (2.4% per year)
G. Insurance Research Council Study of 62,000 closed claims nationwide
supports trends
1. Sprains/strains growing share of all injuries
a) BI claimants, 1987-1992, 66% to 71%
b) PIP claimants, 1987-1992, 58% to 62%
2. BI and PIP claimants with no recorded periods of disability, 1977-
1992
a) BI-40% to 59%
5
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tort threshold by adopting a verbal threshold like New York's. That
state's claimants must suffer a "significant" injury before suing in
tort, as opposed to Minnesota law which includes a dollar thresh-
old.
The key element, overlooked by the many who urge a New
York-type high verbal threshold as a model for no-fault laws, is that
even in New York, claims for pain and suffering above its high
threshold are hugely expensive, contributing disproportionately to
auto insurance costs. As indicated above, the BI-PD ratio more
than doubled in Minnesota from 1980 to 1995. Contrast this to
New York, with a high threshold barring pain and suffering claims,
where the BI-PD ratio remained very constant during the time pe-
riod of 1980 to 1989.2" To illustrate the ill effects of BI tort claims,
even New York's $50,000 threshold in no-fault benefits contributed
only 36% of the total pure premiums for a category of claims in-
cluding both BI tort claims and no-fault (PIP) benefits. In other
words, the relatively few (approximately 15% of the total) tort
claims preserved over New York's high threshold contribute dis-
proportionately (64%) to total personal injury costs (including
both BI and PIP coverage).
Therefore, even New York's law is by no means an optimal
model. New York has long dealt relatively effectively with higher
costs for smaller tort claims, but it deals ineffectively with higher
costs for larger tort claims. The only way to deal with both is to get
rid of claims for noneconomic damages in cases both large and
small. RAND estimates that nationwide almost half of the bodily
injury premiums are used for paying noneconomic losses in states
like New York, which have high PIP benefits coupled with high
thresholds.2" Furthermore, even in New York the possibility of su-
ing in tort above its relatively high threshold is being exploited by
increasingly experienced plaintiffs' counsels. This activity has led
b) PIP-45% to 56%
3. Attorney representation countrywide-all coverage combined in-
creased significantly
a) 1977-31%
b) 1987-42%
c) 1992-46%
See TRENDs, supra note 18, at Part One, 1-4; app. A, tbl. A-i; app. B, tbl. B-24; app.
C, tbl. C-i; CLAIMING BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at 44; Fig. 3-3; Fig. 3-8.
25. See id.; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
26. SeeTRENDs, supra note 18, tbl. A-34.
27. See Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1019-20.
28. See id.
[Vol. 24
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to a more recent rise in New York's BI-PD ratio of almost 50% from
1989 to 1993. 29 Thus, for Minnesota, simply reducing the number
of tort claims for noneconomic loss over a higher threshold, in-
cluding only a verbal definition as in New York, would fail to net
optimal savings.
II. THE CHOICE SYSTEM
Under Minnesota's current no-fault law, every insured motorist
is insured on a no-fault basis for reparation benefits (PIP) covering
economic loss up to $20,000 for medical expenses and $20,000 for
other benefits. A Minnesota motorist, however, can generally re-
cover in tort for noneconomic loss if: 1) he or she has suffered a
permanent injury or disfigurement; 2) death; 3) over $4,000 in
medical treatment; or 4) 60 days of disability.
3
1
Proposed here is reform that replaces Minnesota's no-fault law,
burdened as it is not only by payments made without regard to fault
for economic losses, but also with the expensive, and arguably even
subsidized, 2 claims for noneconomic loss. This new reform could
give motorists the option of forgoing claims for noneconomic loss
33above Minnesota's threshold without forcing them to do so.
Persons electing such coverage (called "switchers") could
never sue or be sued for noneconomic loss if involved in accidents
with any other motorist, switchers or otherwise. Such switchers
would only be allowed to claim in tort against other motorists,
whether switchers or otherwise, for economic loss in excess of their
34no-fault PIP coverage. As to accidents between switchers and
those electing to stay in the current system ("stayers"), the latter
would make a claim based on fault against their own insurer for
noneconomic loss above Minnesota's threshold (under coverage
29. SeeTRENDS, supra note 18, at tbl. A-34.
30. See Maryland Three, supra note 1, at 217. The other benefits include 85%
of lost income up to $250 per week; additional PIP benefits include $200 per week
for replacement services, up to $200 per week for survivor's replacement service
loss, and $2000 for funeral benefits. See id.
31. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.51, subd. 3 (1996).
32. See Maryland Two, supra note 1, at 282 & n.7.
33. See id. at 283; This type of insurance grew out of an article by Jeffrey
O'Connell and Robert H. Joost. See Jeffrey O'Connell & Robert H. Joost, Giving
Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REV. 61 (1986).
34. See Maryland Two, supra note 1, at 283. Note that just as one can opt to
buy more liability insurance than compulsory insurance limits mandate, one could
also opt to buy more PIP coverage than compulsory insurance limits mandate.
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termed "tort maintenance coverage"), much as they do now under
5uninsured motorist coverage. Stayers' tort claims for economic
loss in excess of their own no-fault coverage would be allowed
against switchers. In accidents between two stayers, Minnesota's
current system would apply without change. When claims for only
economic loss by switchers or stayers are pursued, a reasonable at-
torney's fee in addition to economic loss would be recoverable. If
an injury was caused by a tortfeasor's intent or by alcohol or drug
abuse, there would be no restriction on anyone's right to sue for
noneconomic loss. 6 No change would be made in the law applica-
ble to property damage. 3
III. ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF THE CHOICE PLAN
A. General Approach
In reaching these cost conclusions, we first estimated what
auto insurers would have to charge the average private passenger
car insured motorist in Minnesota, under the status quo, to recover
the costs incurred in compensating accident victims under all cov-
erages and limits. We also estimated separately the costs of those
buying only mandatory coverage and limits.m We then developed
corresponding estimates for stayers who elect to retain the status
quo and for switchers who opt for the new plan allowed by choice.
Next, we compared these estimates to determine how the adoption
of the plan allowing choice would affect the costs of auto insur-
ance, depending on whether motorists stay or switch, and whether
they buy more than mandatory coverage.
Under the status quo, Minnesota motorists can purchase sev-
eral different personal injury coverages at various limits - PIP, Bod-
35. See Maryland One, supra note 1, at 1026 & n.48. Uninsured Motorist (UM)
coverage pays up to the limit specified in the policy when the insured, or others in
the insured vehicle, are injured by uninsured or hit-and-run motorists. Thus the
insured's own insurer pays what the injured person is eligible to recover in tort
from the other uninsured, at-fault motorist. Underinsured Motorist (UIM) cover-
age similarly pays the insured and other occupants of the insured vehicle when the
at-fault motorist has liability coverage but with lower limits than those carried by
the insured. See id. at 1028.
36. See Maryland Two, supra note 1, at 283 & n.12.
37. For the rationale for excluding property damage from PIP coverage, see
ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFERY O'CONNELL, BAsIc PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VIcI1M 280-81 (1965).
38. See Maryland Three, supra note 1, at 169 n.53.
[Vol. 24
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss4/9
1998] CONSUMER CHOICE IN MINNESOTA AUTO INSURANCE 833
ily Injury (BI) ,9 and Uninsured Motorist(UM), including Underin-
sured Motorist (UIM). 4° Accordingly, insured motorists must bear
the sum of the compensation costs of any of those coverages at the
limits they buy. We estimated the compensation cost of the status
quo to the average insured motorist by taking the sum of what in-
surers pay out plus the associated transaction costs, under all the
above applicable coverages and limits, divided by the total number
of insured motorists. As indicated, we also computed the average
costs for those buying only mandatory coverages. Motorists who
are uninsured, of course, bear none of the costs of auto insurance.
Under the plan allowing choice, then, motorists may remain in
Minnesota's current system (stayers), elect the new system (switch-41
ers), or be illegally uninsured. Stayers will purchase not only PIP
but also tort maintenance coverage, in addition to BI coverage to
cover claims brought against them by others for both economic
and noneconomic losses of stayers and for economic losses in ex-
cess of the PIP policies of switchers. They may also purchase UM
coverage. Following the pattern set forth in the foregoing para-
graph, we estimate the average stayer's compensation costs under
the plan allowing choice as the sum of what auto insurers pay in-
jured people plus the association transaction costs under all cover-
ages and limits on behalf of stayers, divided by the total number of
stayers. Note that the average stayer's compensation costs include
the costs insurers incur on one's behalf in providing compensation
under personal injury tort liability type coverages -PIP, BI, UM,• 42
and tort maintenance.
Motorists who switch, under the plan allowing choice, pur-
chase not only PIP but also BI to cover tort liability claims brought
against them for economic losses in excess of their victim's own
policy limits.43 Following the pattern set forth above, we estimate
39. Bodily Injury (BI) coverage refers to tort liability coverage for personal
injury, thereby excluding property damage. See Maryland One, supra note 1, at
1028 n.54.
40. See supra note 35.
41. For a proposal allowing motorists to be legally uninsured at the price of
losing any right to claim for noneconomic loss, see Mayland Three, supra note 1, at
207-13.
42. All of these coverages, per terminology adopted by the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners, are subsumed under the term "liability." See
NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, AVERAGE EXPENDITURES & PREMIUMS IN 1994
Technical Notes (1995); see also id. tbl. 2, col. 3.
43. Although no one is required to buy BI liability insurance, those with assets
to protect can be expected to do so.
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the average switcher's compensation costs as the sum of the costs
auto insurers incur on behalf of such motorists for PIP and BI cov-
erage, divided by the number of switchers. Note that switchers will
not need UM coverage." As was the case under the status quo,
people who go uninsured under the plan allowing choice bearS • 45
none of the costs of compensating auto accident victims.
B. The Results
According to an analysis performed by The Joint Economic
Committee (JEC) of the U.S. Congress based on data compiled by
RAND,4 6 the total available savings under the choice plan, if all
Minnesota motorists switched, would be $568 million.47 Regardless
of how many motorists switched to the new plan allowed by choice,
the savings in total auto insurance premiums would be 31% for
switchers who bought only mandatory coverage and 21% for all
switchers.48 The JEC estimates that the premium dollar savings per
Minnesota motorist would be $155. Premiums for stayers would be
relatively unchanged.49
The savings described above for total auto insurance premi-
ums payable by switchers are very substantial because they stem
from savings of about 40% for bodily injury premiums. No change
in premiums for losses to property are envisioned 5 0 . Furthermore,• . 51
such estimates are arguably conservative. For example, with no or
at least greatly lessened incentives to incur medical bills and wage
loss as a means of inflating claims for pain and suffering,52 those
who switch should be inclined to incur lower economic losses
and/or forgo making claims at all, compared to their inclinations
44. Switchers will not need UM coverage because they are guaranteed pay-
ments for economic loss whether or not the other driver is insured. See STEPHEN
CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, NO-FAULT APPROACHES To
COMPENSATING PEOPLE INJURED IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS vii (1991).
45. For more on RAND's methodology, see ALLAN ABRAHAMSE & STEPHEN
CARROLL, RAND INST. FOR CIVILJUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF A CHOICE AUTO INS. PLAN
ON INS. COSTS (1995).
46. See STEPHEN CARROLL, ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CILJUSTICE, THE EFFECr OF
A CHOICE AUTO. INS. PLAN ON INS. COSTS & COMPENSATION: AN UPDATED ANALYSIS
tbl. 5 (1998).
47. SeeJOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, supra note 19, at 35.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Maryland Three, supra note 1, at 165 n.22.
51. See id. at 175 n.72.
52. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 24
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under the tort system. The above estimates, however, do not in-
clude such reductions. Note that the savings mirror progressive
taxation in that they are higher still for the less affluent. Because
the poor generally drive older cars and therefore rarely buy op-
tional collision or comprehensive coverages, low income motorists
who buy only mandatory coverage under a choice plan save the
most in absolute terms. The result will be a significantly positive
impact on the fragile financial status of low-income motorists. Mo-
torists with low incomes have little left for discretionary spending;
thus each dollar of savings may go directly to necessities such as
food and shelter that may otherwise be sacrificed. Currently, less
affluent motorists may spend over 30% 54 of their annual household
income on auto insurance and many are forced to put off buying
basic necessities in order to pay their premium.55 A study of low in-
come insured motorists of Maricopa County, Arizona found that
44% were forced at some point to postpone buying food in order
to pay their auto insurance premiums, thus being forced to
choose between putting food on the family table or complying with
the law. In addition to consuming an exorbitant amount of in-
come, the prohibitive cost of auto insurance has the potential of
even more dire effects on the less affluent. Minnesota, like many
states, has a compulsory insurance law penalizing those who go un-
insured. 57 Financially strapped individuals reliant on their vehicles
for transportation to work may be forced to give up their driving
58
privileges due to their inability to afford auto insurance. The loss
of driving privileges may in turn result in the loss of employment
opportunities and propel them into total impoverishment and de-
pendency on publicly funded support.
The cost estimates contained herein are somewhat lower than
previous estimates by RAND and the JEC.59 The previous estimates
53. See Maryland Two, supra note 1, at 289 & n.42.
54. See ROBERT L. MARIL, THE IMPACT OF MANDATORY AUTO INS. UPON Low
INCOME RESIDENTS OF MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA 8-9, 11 (1993).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See Maryland Three, supra note 1, at 217; see also MINN. STAT. § 169.797
(1996).
58. SeeJOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, supra note 19, at 35. Cf infta note 59 and
accompanying text.
59. For example, the JEC, based on RAND data findings, assumed earlier that
the (1) total savings in Minnesota would be $1,041,000 if all motorists switched to
PIP; and (2) that regardless of how many motorists switched the savings in total
auto insurance for low income switchers who bought only the mandatory coverage
11
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were based on 1987 data whereas the latest ones are based on 1992
data. Economic losses from auto accidents increased from 1987 to
1992: Due to inflation, accident victims in RAND's 1992 database
suffered economic losses that were significantly greater, on average,
than the losses suffered by accident victims in RAND's 1987 data-
base. In California, as an example, 1987 accident victims incurred
an average of $5,433 (1987 dollars) in economic losses, whereas in
1992 California accident victims incurred an average of $10,286
(1992 dollars) in economic losses. Motorists nonetheless, have
generally not increased their policy limits to keep pace with the
rate of growth in losses. As a larger fraction of 1992 accident vic-
tims' economic losses neared insurance policy limits, compensation
from auto insurance grew at a slower rate than did economic losses
claimed. For example, the ratio of auto insurance compensation to
economic loss in California fell from 1.04 in 1987, to 0.88 in 1992.
As a result, more auto insurance premium payments went for
economic, rather than noneconomic losses. Thus eliminating
noneconomic damages results in lower savings. Therefore, 1992-
based estimates of the cost of compensating auto accident victims
for economic losses alone under the choice plan are greater.
Hence, its updated estimates of the plan's savings from eliminating
payment for noneconomic losses are lower than were the earlier
1987-based estimates.
This is a "bad news, good news" scenario for advocates of auto
choice. The "bad news" is that the percentage of savings for motor-
ists who choose to abandon claims for pain and suffering declines
as passing years inflate economic losses from auto accidents while
financial responsibility limits remain stable. The "good news" for
auto choice advocates is that as the years go by the tort system is
paying less and less for noneconomic loss and more and more for
only economic loss-and paying for the latter based on fault. If
motorists are to be paid only for economic loss, critics of the tort
system might ask, why filter such payment though a fault-based sys-
tem with all its attendant transaction costs, including one third for
the claimant's lawyer, increasingly extracted not from the "extra"
payment for pain and suffering but from the amount meant to
compensate for the client's own economic losses? 60
would be about 60%, and 41% for all switchers, with an average premium savings
per motorist of $296. See JOINT ECONOMIC COMMIT-EE, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES, THE BENEFITS AND SAVINGS OF AUTO-CHOICE 9 (1997).
60. For a study emphasizing the necessity of combining payments without
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reference to fault with the concomitant elimination of claims for pain and suffer-
ing as a means of controlling auto insurance costs, seeJ. David Cummins & Sharon
Tennyson, Controlling Automobile Insurance Costs, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 95 (1992); see
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13
O'Connell et al.: Consumer Choice in the Minnesota Auto Insurance Market
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss4/9
